The African campaign’s one of the most exciting of World War 2, even though it was just a side-show. It was on a small scale. So it’s easy to know the geography and the personalities. When you get to Russia the numbers and distances are so vast that it is nowhere as easy to get your heads around.

In Rommel’s diary, of his experiences in World War 2, he gave his account about why he had failed in North Africa, particularly at El Alamein. Perhaps also why the Axis had failed, and even more to the point why Germany had failed. But at the end of it, the failure of this campaign can mostly be laid at Rommel’s doorstep – not that Rommel admits that.

Martin van Creveldt, in his book Supplying War, gave his analysis of why the North African campaign failed – from a logistics point of view. I’m going to start with Rommel’s own account. Because he was forced to commit suicide on 14 October 1944, he never got to learn more about what had happened during the war, after the war had ended, from his enemies on the other side of the hill. His analysis was made during the war. So in some ways its more honest, although not many of us can be as honest about ourselves as we like to think. So here's what Rommel has to say – as I said mainly focussing on the climactic defensive battle of El Alamein.

Tag words: Field Marshal Erwin Rommel; North African Campaign; El Alamein; Martin van Creveldt; Supplying War; The Rommel Papers; Panzerarmee Afrika; Operation Torch; Vichy France; Malta; Tobruk; Tripoli; RAF; David Irving; The Trail of the Fox; Enigma machine; Ultra; General Enno von Rintelen; Adolf Hitler;