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In Clark v. Sweeney, the Supreme Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that had granted habeas relief on a theory the petitioner never raised. A Maryland jury convicted Jeremiah Sweeney of second-degree murder, and his convictions were affirmed on appeal. In postconviction proceedings, Sweeney argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request voir dire of the full jury after a juror conducted an unauthorized visit to the crime scene. State courts rejected that claim, and the federal district court likewise denied habeas relief, concluding that the state court’s application of Strickland was not objectively unreasonable.

The Fourth Circuit reversed, not on the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually asserted, but on a new theory that a combination of failures by the juror, the judge, and counsel violated Sweeney’s confrontation and jury rights. The panel ordered a new trial despite the State never having the opportunity to address that theory. A dissent criticized the majority for disregarding fundamental principles of party presentation.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit had “departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” In the Court’s view, federal courts may not grant relief on claims the petitioner did not present and that the State had no chance to contest. The case is remanded for the Fourth Circuit to evaluate only the ineffective-assistance claim Sweeney actually pursued, under AEDPA’s deferential standards governing federal review of state adjudications of Strickland claims.

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The United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court upholding the use of a physical screen that prevented a four-year-old child witness from seeing the defendant during trial. Mississippi law mandates the use of such screens for child witnesses in abuse cases. Relying on that statute, the trial court permitted the screen without taking evidence or making any case-specific finding that the arrangement was necessary to protect the witness.

On review, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the statute, combined with state constitutional victims’ rights provisions, distinguished the case from Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, which require individualized findings before limiting face-to-face confrontation. The dissent argued that those precedents squarely controlled and that the trial court failed to comply with their requirements.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that Coy and Craig govern: a deviation from face-to-face confrontation is permissible only after the trial court hears evidence and finds that testifying in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma that impairs the child’s ability to communicate. The mandatory nature of Mississippi’s statute could not substitute for those constitutional findings, and the trial court’s reliance on the statute alone was insufficient.

The Court remanded for consideration of whether the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Goldey v. Fields

PER CURIAM. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials.

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This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388. Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special factors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135. This case arises in a new context, and “special factors” counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148– 149. In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the “inordinately difficult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such “procedures are ‘not as effective as an individual damages remedy.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

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Trump v. CASA, Inc.

Held: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. Pp. 4– 26.

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Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that formulates evidence-based recommendations regarding preventive healthcare services. Congress codified the Task Force’s role in 1999, establishing it as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in HHS’s Public Health Service. The Task Force currently consists of 16 volunteer members appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Before 2010, Task Force recommendations were purely advisory. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 changed this by requiring most health insurers and group health plans to cover without cost sharing those preventive services that receive “A” or “B” ratings from the Task Force. The Act also amended the governing statute to describe the Task Force as “independent” and to provide that members and their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U. S. C. §§299b–4(a)(1), (6). Plaintiffs, individuals and small businesses who object to the Affordable Care Act’s preventive-services coverage requirements, sued in federal court. Lead plaintiff Braidwood Management runs a health and wellness center offering insurance coverage to its approximately 70 employees through a self-insured plan. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal officers under the Appointments Clause who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” Art. II, §2, cl. 2, not by the Secretary. The District Court agreed, recognizing that Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary but concluding they are principal officers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646. While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary in June 2023 ratified existing appointments made by the AHRQ Director and began personally appointing Task Force members. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that while Task Force members are removable at will, they are not inferior officers because they cannot be “ ‘independent’ ” and “free from ‘political pressure’ ” while simultaneously being supervised by a political appointee.

Held: Task Force members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause.

Read by RJ Dieken.

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FCC v. Consumers’ Research

The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC and instructed it to make available to “all the people of the United States,” reliable communications services “at reasonable charges.” 47 U. S. C. §151. That objective is today known as “universal service.” The universal-service project arose from the concern that pure market mechanisms would leave some population segments—such as the poor and those in rural areas—without access to needed communications services. Under the 1934 Act, the FCC pursued universal service primarily through implicit subsidies, using its rate-regulation authority to lower costs for some consumers at the expense of others.

Congress created a new framework of this Act in 1996. Section 254 now requires every carrier to "contribute" to the Universal Service Fund. The FCC then uses this money to pay for universal service programs. The statutory scheme designates certain beneficiaries of these subsidies--such as low-income consumers, rural areas and hospitals, schools, and libraries. It also provides details for how to determine what services should be accessible. To determine what to subsize, the FCC “shall consider the extent to which” a service is “essential to education, public health, or public safety” and has “been subscribed to by a substantial majority of residential customers.” §§254(c)(1)(A)–(B). It also must determine if a service can be provided at an affordable rate. §254(b)(1). There are also certain principles the FCC is told to base its policies, including Section 254 also sets forth “principles” on which the FCC “shall base” its universal-service policies. §254(b). Among other things, those principles direct that all consumers, “including low-income consumers” and those in “rural” areas, should have access to quality services at affordable prices. See ibid. The FCC also may add “other principles” found both “consistent with” the Act and “necessary and appropriate for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” §254(b)(7). To calculate how much carriers must contribute to the Fund, the FCC has devised a formula, known as the “contribution factor.” That factor is a fraction, expressed as a percentage, whose numerator is the Fund’s projected quarterly expenses (the subsidy payments it will make plus overhead) and whose denominator is contributing carriers’ total projected quarterly revenue. A carrier must pay into the Fund an amount equal to its own projected revenue multiplied by the contribution factor. §54.709(a)(3). The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). Each quarter, the Administrator projects the Fund’s expenses, adds up revenue estimates it receives from carriers, and submits those figures to the Commission for approval and eventual use in calculating the contribution factor. See §§54.709(a)(2)–(3).

The FCC has appointed the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private, not-for-profit corporation, as the Fund’s “permanent Administrator.” §54.701(a). The Administrator manages the Fund’s day-to-day operations and also plays a role in producing the financial projections that end up determining the contribution factor. See §§54.702, 54.709(a)(2)–(3). In the full Fifth Circuit’s view, the combination of Congress’s delegation to the FCC and the FCC’s “subdelegation” to the Administrator violated the Constitution, even if neither delegation did so independently.

Held: The universal-service contribution

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Held: Parents challenging the Board’s introduction of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks, along with its decision to withhold opt outs, are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Read by Jeff Barnum.

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Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

Texas, like many States, prohibits distributing sexually explicit content to children. In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, requiring certain commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content that is obscene to minors to verify that visitors are 18 or older. Knowing violations subject covered entities to injunctions and civil penalties. Petitioners—representatives of the pornography industry—sued the Texas attorney general to enjoin enforcement of H. B. 1181 as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. They alleged that adults have a right to access the covered speech, and that the statute impermissibly hinders them. The Fifth Circuit held that an injunction was not warranted because petitioners were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court viewed H. B. 1181 as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials obscene for minors.” 95 F. 4th 263, 269, 271. It therefore determined that the law is not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.

Held: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of adults.

Read by RJ Dieken.