Whether or not non-Muslims are subject to Sharīʿa responsibilities has been treated in various contexts in works of uṣul al-fiqh and fiqh. Across schools of thought the prevalent view has been that non-Muslim are indeed subject to sharia responsibilities before God. This position is endorsed by Imāmī Shīʿa legal theorists such as Sharīf alMurtaḍā (d. 436/1044), Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), and ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 460/1067). Each of these considered the question within the context of the linguistic discussions of uṣul al-fiqh framed within enquiries regarding the scope of the imperative. Does the imperative include the non-Muslim and the slave as it includes the Muslim and the free person? This paper will examine how this position has been nuanced by some modern Shīʿī Uṣūlī’s, in response to an Akhbārī rejections of the prevalent view, by distinguishing between universal moral responsibilities applicable to all and particular Sharīʿa addresses only incumbent upon believers. The paper will further point to some contemporary implications of this distinction for our understanding of the nature and practice of Sharīʿa in plural contexts.

The main question addressed in this paper is: “Can jurists rely on moral judgments to disregard or qualify scriptural evidence?” The standard answer to this question among later uṣūlī scholars is yes, provided that the moral judgment in question is “conclusive”. Otherwise, the scriptural evidence will retain its validity. In applying this principle to particular cases, such as child marriage, jurists working within this paradigm split into two groups: a minority who claim that the moral judgment in question is certain, and accordingly modify or set aside the conflicting scriptural evidence; and a majority who believe that the moral judgment in question is not certain, and consequently resolve the conflict in favour of scriptural evidence. Regarding the level of justification one can legitimately claim for moral judgments, the second group are correct in most cases. Therefore, granting the dominant paradigm, the path of moral reforms in jurisprudence is effectively closed. However, one can ask whether such a stringent condition as certainty for the permissibility of using moral judgments in jurisprudential arguments is rationally defensible. In this paper, I try to show that such a condition is indefensible, and hence the dominant paradigm lacks rational credibility. Based on the alternative paradigm that I propose and defend, the conflict we face here is of an epistemological and hermeneutical nature. Thus, the appropriate solution to this conflict is to weigh the evidence we have in favour of moral judgments against conflicting scriptural evidence and prioritise the stronger, i.e., the evidence with a higher probability of being true. Within this paradigm, for moral judgments to take precedence over opposing scriptural evidence, it is sufficient that the moral judgment has stronger rational support by virtue of being more probable than the conflicting scriptural evidence. This paradigm provides a rational basis for moral reforms in jurisprudence.

The linguistic principle of absoluteness leads to the absolutisation of a regulation in terms of the unrestricted scope of the applicability of its referent. Thus, the statement “respect the scholar” due to lack of qualifiers will yield the meaning of obligation as opposed to encouragement from the form of the imperative “respect” and this respect will be applicable to every type of scholar by virtue of the unqualified clause the “scholar”. The outcome is the obligation of respect to every scholar regardless of the scholar’s denomination, field of expertise and piety. The principle of absoluteness is utilised as a legal hermeneutical tool for the interpretation of evidences across the chapters of jurisprudence. A fundamental assumption in the principle of absoluteness is that the lawgiver is in a position to explicate his intention fully including all possible qualifications pertinent to the regulation and scope of its application in relation to the subject. Thus, by not restricting qualifiable terms the implication is that there are no qualifications to the regulation and to its scope of application. Having stated this the unqualified clause can be qualified at any point within the timeframe of the lawgiver which is a period of over two centuries. Thus, an absolutised verse of the Quran due to lack of qualifications within the Quran may be qualified and restricted by the statements of the Prophet or anyone of the subsequent twelve Imams. Analysing the phenomena of post-absolutised restrictions demonstrates rationally that the absolutised regulation was not absolute in essence from the outset but yet was treated as an absolute prior to its qualification since the qualifications can be delayed for up to a couple of centuries. This phenomenon reflects on the fallibilism of the absolutised regulations. Additionally, it shows that the issuance of unqualified regulations was resorted to at a pragmatic level and on utilitarian basis. The regulations are designed to secure their values in an overall manner and for the majority of individuals. Existentially it is difficult to conceive of absolute regulations; all regulations are bound by their existential contexts. In light of the above it is argued that: 1. existentially the lawgiver cannot be in a position to explicate all the qualifications beyond the lawgiver’s immediate context with a view to catering for the majority. 2. since the regulations are value-bearing the qualifications can be conceived through refined human learning and experience in every field of life. 3. existence being dynamic can effect change in relations of things to human beings. Such changes can qualify originally absolutised regulations and similarly restricted regulations may become absolutised by the same token.

Among contemporary scholars dedicated to examining the intersection of language and Islamic legal theory, Bernard G. Weiss’ contributions to the study of Islamic law frequently emphasise the paramount importance of linguistic inquiries and language analysis (al-mabādiʾ al-lughawiyya or mabāḥith al-alfāẓ) within the uṣūl alfiqh literature. By taking into account a few late-19th/early-20th century digests and manuals used in the madrasa curriculum, his doctoral dissertation Language and Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of “Waḍʿ al-Lughah” and its Development and his subsequent articles on ʿilm al-waḍʿ (1966, 1976, and 1987) provided an initial general overview of a new science called ʿilm al-waḍʿ to a Western audience, underscoring its significance within the framework of legal methodology. Nevertheless, the extensive 14th - 20th century exegetical literature of ʿilm al-waḍʿ, originating from the foundational al-Risāla al-Waḍʿiyya of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355), as well as the contexts in which this short text emerged, remain largely unexplored and understudied. The linguistic investigations of basic elements of language (nouns, verbs, and prepositions) undertaken by early commentators and glossators on al-Ījī’s Risāla are mainly devoted to analysing the roots of signification but also to developing a semantic theory that filled critical gaps in various disciplines, like balāgha, uṣūl al-fiqh, and logic. In general, ʿilm al-waḍʿ (lit. the science of linguistic positing), which can be loosely rendered as “semantics of the parts of speech,” examines how terms come to convey their concepts and, particularly, how terms convey particular and individual, or universal and general concepts. The original scope of ʿilm al-waḍʿ aimed to elucidate how terms, such as prepositions and pronouns, are posited in a universal way yet ultimately convey particular and individual concepts. The innovative solutions provided by ʿilm al-waḍʿ for explaining the semantic properties of this group of terms were so influential that premodern scholars, mainly commentators and glossators on al-Ījī’s Risāla, expanded the scope of this science, developing a comprehensive semantic theory that encompassed all parts of speech and simple sentence structures, while also engaging with the ḥaqīqa-majāz dichotomy. This presentation will first offer a heretofore unprecedented survey of the emergence and subsequent formation of ʿilm al-waḍʿ as an independent, and yet interdisciplinary, science between uṣūl al-fiqh and ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān. It will then present some aspects of the linguistic investigations undertaken by legal theorists prior to the emergence and establishment of ʿilm al-waḍʿ, in order to highlight the innovative and original contributions that this new discipline introduced into the broader discourse of the linguistic inquiries. Finally, it will offer some preliminary reflections on how ʿilm al-waḍʿ has impacted legal theorists’ analysis of language and uṣūl al-fiqh literature.

Can a perfectly good and wise God impose “impossible obligations” (takīf bi mā lāyotāq), that is, obligations surpassing human ability? This question holds profound significance within Islamic theology and carries weighty implications in the realm of Islamic law and morality, particularly concerning the comprehension of divine commands. For example, if one concedes that a perfectly good and wise God cannot (or does not) mandate impossible obligations, then an individual may reasonably question the religious validity of any prescription of Sharia if it is demonstrated to exceed human capacity. As I have argued in this paper, one’s position on this matter is tightly connected to the principle of Ultra posse nemo obligatur or “ought implies can” (from now on “the ability principle”). Historically, Muʿtazili, Shīʿī, and Māturīdi scholars have advocated for the ability principle and thus the notion that a perfectly good and wise God cannot issue impossible commands. Many of these scholars argued that the truth of the ability principle is necessary and evident to reason, while they also offered some textual and rational justifications for their position. In recent times, some modernist Shīʿī scholars have leveraged the ability principle and the concept of the immorality of impossible obligations not only as a guiding principle to reform traditional Islamic jurisprudence but also as a cornerstone for the revival of a morally sensitive understanding of religion in general, which they term "humane religion" or Dīn-e Insānī or Dīn-e Rahmānī. Conversely, Ashʿarī scholars have contested this principle and thus asserted that it falls within God’s power and authority to impose obligations beyond human ability. This paper sets out to first analyse different types of “ought” and “can” to identify the most appropriate understandings of these concepts in the context of moral and legal obligations. Second, it explores the traditional Ashʿarī arguments, championed by Abu Hamid Muhammad Ghazali, challenging the ability principle and advocating for the moral permissibility of God's imposition of impossible obligations. Additionally, it delves into traditional Muʿtazili and Shīʿī responses to this notion, as articulated by Qazi Abdul Jabbar and Shaykh Tusi. However, it finally argues that the ability principle (and consequently, its theological and legal implications) faces some new philosophical challenges that warrant careful consideration. There are at least three scenarios that can be counted against the ability principle and its theological and legal implications: First, the phenomenon of psychological compulsion, such as kleptomania. Second, scenarios originally offered by Harry Frankfurt (known as “Frankfurt cases”), and finally, cases in which the moral status of one person’s action depends on some other person’s having a certain moral obligation. This paper briefly examines these new challenges and argues that there are ways to meet them.

Muslim jurists infer, or justify, knowledge of Sharia regulations by primarily taking recourse to the apparent linguistic indication (ẓāhir) of the scriptural sources of the Quran and hadith corpora. These scriptural injunctions of Sharia are regarded as being based on values, with adherence to them considered beneficial to humanity and capable of mitigating harm. While Sharia's scriptural injunctions originated in the context of physical reality, contemporary society is increasingly becoming familiar with virtual environments, including virtual reality, augmented reality, video games and virtual worlds, broadly referred to as the Metaverse. As virtual reality unfolds as a multifaceted digital environment with interactive capabilities akin to the physical world, and with new user interfaces and more realistic graphics, it inevitably introduces new dimensions of ethical and religious inquiry, intersecting with technology, ethics, and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). For instance, Sharia has plentiful injunctions relating to actual reality including injunctions concerning sexuality, violence, deception, economics/trade, unlawful social interaction etc; however, the question that arises is whether these injunctions are also applicable and extendable to human actions in virtual reality? In navigating this uncharted terrain, Muslim jurists and theologians must grapple with a spectrum of normative dilemmas pertaining to both deontological Sharia regulations (al-aḥkām al-taklīfiyya) and situational Sharia regulations (al-aḥkām al-waḍʿiyya). As such, they must meticulously scrutinise semantic and interpretative methodologies to decern the applicability of Sharia injunctions to the complexities of virtual reality. The paper will explore the applicability and extension of scriptural injunctions to the following areas: 1. Individuals’ interaction with virtual objects and the virtual economy. 2. Individuals’ interaction with virtual characters, known as NPCs (non-playable characters), or AI avatars. 3. Individuals’ interaction with another real person’s avatar This paper embarks on a thought-provoking inquiry: to what extent can scriptural injunctions of Sharia be extended from their original context to the domain of virtual reality? If such extension is deemed plausible, what implications arise regarding the applicability of these injunctions in assessing an individual’s actions, interactions, and behaviours within virtual environments? Specifically, our analysis will focus on the relevance of technical Uṣūlī hermeneutical concepts, notably exploring linguistic principles such as the primacy of unrestricted meaning (aṣālat al-iṭlāq) and the primacy of generality (aṣālat al-ʿumūm) of scripture. We seek to determine whether these linguistic principles, traditionally applied in physical reality, retain their validity within virtual reality contexts. This examination encompasses existing virtual environments as well as potential future technologies, such as brain-computer interfaces or haptic suits, which augment users' sensory experiences within the virtual realm.

Absolute or unrestricted (muṭlaq) versus delimited (muqayyad) is a key area in the study of language and meaning (mabāḥith al-alfāẓ) in Islamic Legal Theory (uṣūl alfiqh). It deeply affects the understanding and interpretation of the apparent linguistic (ẓāhir) indication of Scripture and Tradition (Sunna), thereby deducing new, or justifying pre-existing, jurisprudential, ethical, and theological knowledge of Islam. This section in uṣūl al-fiqh includes three major chapters: preliminary discussions, the rulings of absolute expression (aḥkām al-iṭlāq), and the rulings when both absolute and delimited expressions coexist. The second chapter is divided into the utterances of absolute expression (alfāẓ al-iṭlāq) and the quality of indication of these utterances to absolute expression. This paper focuses on how the absolute (muṭlaq) indicates absolute expression (iṭlāq) and comprehensiveness (shumūl). Is this implication by designation (waḍʿ) or does it depend on context (qarīna)? Among Shi’ite Uṣūlis, the dominant approach since the 11th AH/17th AD century is the necessity of general context (qarīna ʿāmma) for absolute expression (iṭlāq). This general context depends on the realisation of a few necessary preliminaries, which are called “the necessary preliminaries of wisdom/ rationality” (muqadammāt al-ḥikma). There are at least three necessary preliminaries: first, the possibility of absolute and delimited expression; second, the speaker (mutakallim) must be in “the situation of a clear statement of complete intention” (maqām al-bayān li tamām al-murād) and not in “indetermination” (ihmāl) or ambiguity (ijmāl); third, the negation of what requires specification (ta’yīn). The focus has been on the second preliminary, analysing its boundaries and meaning. How can we determine if the speaker—here, the Lawmaker (Shāriʿ)—is in the “situation of a clear statement for complete intention”? What are its precise criteria? This paper examines holding absolute (al-tamassuk bi al-iṭlāq) in various fiqh cases and argues for a revision. If the Lawmaker’s situation is unclear, what does the foundational principle (al-aṣl al-awwali) require? Focusing on Imāmi uṣūl al-fiqh, this paper also provides a comparative analysis with Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh and linguistic philosophy. It comprises three sections: an overview of absolute and delimited (muṭlaq wa muqayyad), a literature review of “the necessary preliminaries of wisdom” (muqadammāt al-ḥikma), and the criteria for “the situation of a clear statement of complete intention” (maqām al-bayān li tamām al-murād).

The intricate relationships among the various sources of Islamic legal reasoning have long constituted some of the most vigorously discussed and contentious subjects. These include the relationships between: The Qurʾān and Sunna; text (naṣṣ) and reason (ʿaql); consensus (ijmaʿ) and the Qurʾān and Sunna; the internal dynamics within the religious texts themselves; the connections between analogical reasoning (qiyās) and textual evidence (al-adilla al-lafẓiyya), and others. Notably, the question of how conjectural Sunna (al-sunna al-ẓanniyya) like solitary narrations (pl. al-akhbār al-āḥād) relate to and potentially qualify (taqyīd) or specify (takhṣīṣ) the Qurʾān has been a pivotal topic extensively debated throughout the history of Islamic legal theory. Carrying profound implications on whether or not such solitary narrations possess the epistemic authority to specify and/or qualify the general indication of the Qurʾān or not. This paper aims to trace the historical evolution of the theory permitting ‘specifying of the Qurʾān through solitary reports’ (takhṣīṣ al-Qurʾān bil-khabr al-wāḥid) , analysing perspectives from both Sunnī and Shīʿī traditions. Among Sunnī scholars, the issue sparked numerous debates and stark scholarly divisions. In contrast, the Imāmī Shīʿī majority endorsed such qualification/specification, albeit with certain significant exceptions from early scholars. I will review the major critiques levelled against this specification theory and the responses from its proponents, as well as examine both the methodological and epistemological grounds underlying its construction within Sunnī and Shīʿī legal theories. Additionally, I will address the crucial issue of delineating the relationship between qualifying or specifying the Qurʾān through solitary reports, and the theory of abrogation (naskh) of the Qurʾān through such narrations, along with the consequent implications. Building upon this analysis, I will evaluate and critique the fundamental premises of the specification theory and uncover the extent to which the specification or qualification of the Qurʾān by solitary narrations is present in the practise of ijtihād. This will be done by examining whether the Qurʾān actually contains any general indications (ʿumūmāt), such that a jurist is able to qualify or specify the general indication of the Qurʾān by a solitary report. This entails analysing the legal (sharʿī) nature of the Qurʾānic texts regarding their amenability to generalisation. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn regarding the extent to which rejecting the theory of specifying or qualifying the Qurʾān through solitary narrations impacts the overall corpus of Islamic legal theory and the juristic edicts (pl. fatāwa) in contemporary times.