As Belgrade burned with rage following the death of Ambassador Hartwig, Berchtold was on the verge of his greatest triumph.

After several intense weeks of pressure, Stefan Tisza seemed finally to be seeing the light. A combination of factors, including German pressure, agitation from his subordinates, fear of Romania, outrage at Serbia, and probably exhaustion, all moved Tisza to accept a policy of war. Tisza was eager to clarify that this did not render him a hawk - he still wished for peace if this was possible. Yet, he no longer blocked the construction of an ultimatum designed to be impossible for Serbia to accept, and he no longer flew the lonely flag for diplomacy. How had Tisza been persuaded, and what did it mean for Berchtold, to finally have a united Cabinet behind him? Here we consider these critical questions, in a pivotal turning point of the July Crisis.

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Now that German support had been acquired, and the delivery of an ultimatum to Serbia was virtually guaranteed, Berchtold had one final mission - to persuade the Hungarian Premier Stefan Tisza of the necessity of war.

This was easier said than done, since Tisza had good reasons for resisting calls for a war which he believed was unnecessary and dangerous. But Berchtold was fortunate in that the Hungarian was in the minority - Tisza was the only senior Habsburg official to press for a diplomatic resolution to the assassination, and he knew he was alone in this. The pressure was bound to increase on him to make the 'right' decision, but just over the border in Serbia, a shocking incident momentarily jolted Berchtold away from his mission.

Nikolai Hartwig, Russian ambassador to Belgrade since 1909, arrived at the Austrian embassy in Belgrade to finally pay his respects. The date was 10 July 1914, and Hartwig was there to counter several unflattering rumours regarding his reaction to the assassination. Hartwig was also keenly interested in any news of Austria's intentions towards Serbia. It had now been a fortnight since the assassination, and surely Vienna did not intend to do nothing. But Hartwig never learned these secrets, because he dropped dead of a massive heart attack just as he and his Austrian colleague were getting down to business. Although what followed contained no shortage of farce and conspiracy, Hartwig's death was yet another red flag, and to Berchtold, it furnished yet more proof that Austria would never be safe so long as Serbia went unpunished.

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By 7 July 1914, Austria-Hungary's leading officials gathered in Vienna. The key item on the agenda was what to do about Serbia, but an unspoken item amounted to what to do about Hungary.

With German support for the punitive strike on Serbia now assured, all that remained was for the Habsburg government to maintain a degree of unity at such a crucial moment in its history. Yet, unfortunately for Berchtold, Stefan Tisza - the Hungarian Minister President or Premier - refused to give his approval for the kind of aggressive policy most in Vienna now wanted. Tisza feared the acquisition of more Slavic territories, which would dilute the Hungarian influence, but he was also fearful of Russian intervention on Serbia's side, and Romanian intrusions into Transylvania.

The solution, as Berchtold understood it, was to up the ante. Pressure would be heavily applied on the Hungarian holdout, and an impression of firmness would be presented to the German ally. After many years second guessing her ally, Germany had now signalled its willingness to support Austria regardless of the complications, and this gift could not be squandered. Yet still, Tisza's position was not irrational, and it was at least possible that the Hungarian could have an outsized impact on Austrian policy.

Indeed, as we will see, Stefan Tisza was instrumental in delaying the Austrian response, removing its element of surprise, and increasing the risks surrounding it. Berchtold could not change the 1867 Compromise which granted Hungary such powers, but he could use his contacts to wear Tisza down, and make him more amenable to a swift, firm response. Whether this was war, or diplomatic triumph, or whether an ultimatum should be sent at all, were matters which were still to be hammered out.

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