Marshall, Blake, and Mike wrap up the "Tea, Drugs, and Jesus" series with a review of how the United States misunderstood China in various ways at various times during the history of relations between the two countries between the late 18th century and 1972, as well as what broader themes of misunderstanding recurred throughout that history. They then discuss how the United States continues to misunderstand China today, and how it similarly misjudges the motivations, behaviors, and actions of many other countries, leading to mistakes and failure — all because of America's incuriosity about the world, its resulting lack of cultural literacy, and its propensity to ignore or fire experts who tell American leaders things they — and often the American public — do not want to hear about the world around them.

When Chinese "volunteers" intervened in the Korean War in 1950, American relations with the People's Republic of China fell into an icy abyss from which they did not emerge until President Richard Nixon made his momentous decision to transform world politics by visiting Beijing in 1972. In the United States, the "loss" of China to what Americans thought of as monolithic "world communism" led during the intervening two decades to the "Red Scare," the "Lavender Scare," blacklisting, and growing U.S. involvement in conflict in Southeast Asia — all while American policymakers ignored, fired, and even ruined the reputations and careers of experts who tried to give them advice on the realities of China, Vietnam, communism, and international relations during the Cold War.

Marshall, Blake, and Mike engage in a wide-ranging discussion of American policy disputes over what to do about China after World War II. President Truman, Secretaries of State George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson, Madame Chiang and her family, General Claire Chennault, Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, the CIA, the domino theory, the American idea of monolithic “international communism,” and anti-colonial nationalist movements in Southeast Asia all play roles as Marshall lays out three options U.S. policymakers debated between 1945 and 1950: Should the United States follow the advice of the “China hands” by turning its back on the corrupt Nationalist government of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek and instead recognize the Communist government of the People’s Republic of China as China’s legitimate government? Or should America take the view of policy realists that China had little strategic value to the United States and was a sociopolitical mess not worth being involved in? Or should America do what the “China lobby” — the supporters of Chiang Kai-shek — wanted and go all in with continued support to Chiang? When Communist Chinese “volunteers” intervene in the Korean War in 1950, the American idea that Communism is monolithic solidifies, leading to consequences in the United States that, ironically, give events in China far more influence over the United States than America ever had in China.