Episodios

  • July 3 Anniversary Episode Delay
    Jul 2 2024

    In case you haven't guessed it, the format for these anniversary episodes is a tad, what we call, "toime-consuming". July 3rd's will be a day or two late. Just in case you're dying to find out how this battle ends.

    [coughs] www.patreon.com/addressinggettysburg

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    4 m
  • Battle of Gettysburg- July 2, 1863- 161st Anniversary Special
    Jul 2 2024
    Start your day RIGHT with our new coffee brand Little Ground Top by ordering your bags here www.addressinggettysburg.com/cafe Help us hire a staff for these labor-intensive episodes. It'll only take a few thousand of ye! ;-) Become a Patron and learn more about the Civil War with over 300 episodes just for you. www.patreon.com/addressinggettysburg During the early morning hours of July 2, an already sleep-deprived Union Army of the Potomac commander, George Gordon Meade, arrived at Gettysburg to find fresh Federal soldiers reinforcing the battered elements of the army from the previous day's battle. After conferring with his subordinates, Meade rode out to look at the ground. He decided to stay and fight. The Union position was a strong one. Cemetery Hill dominated the surrounding landscape and offered the Union defenders a strong artillery position. Two key roads that led into Gettysburg from Maryland intersected just north of the hill. Those two roads were crucial avenues of resupply and, if necessary, retreat for the Union Army. The side controlling the hill controlled the field, but the position had one weakness. When he arrived the previous day to act in Meade's stead, Union Second Corps Commander Winfield Scott Hancock assessed the position and reported to Meade that it was strong, but the Confederates could turn its left flank. This fact didn't escape Robert E. Lee's experienced eye, either. He astutely turned his attention to planning the action for July 2, devising a strategy that would test the mettle of the Union Army. With Meade deciding to stay, Lee needed to determine the best way to knock the Federals off their strong position. A direct assault on Cemetery Hill could prove devastating for Lee's infantry as they would have to cross open farm fields to attack the hill. Subordinate commanders convinced Lee not to attack the Union Right near Culp's Hill. Just before dawn, Lee dispatched reconnaissance parties to determine the terrain on the Union left and the dispositions of the Army of the Potomac. One such party returned and reported no Union soldiers in the area of Little Round Top. After conferring with his commanders, Lee made his decision. James Longstreet, his trusted second-in-command, his "old warhorse," would take two divisions and, under concealment, get into position to attack the flank of the Union Line. Once Longstreet was in position. His orders directed him to attack north, along the Emmitsburg Road, and roll up the Union left. While Longstreet was executing this move [getting into position?], Ewell's Second Corps would demonstrate on the Union Right to prevent reinforcements from being sent to meet Longstreet. Ewell's demonstration would become an attack if Ewell thought it feasible. [Chas Fennell on this part of the plan] It was a bold plan. One that Confederate General James Longstreet did not care for, but, ever the consummate soldier, he followed orders. Longstreet's Corps, consisting of three divisions under Generals McLaws, Pickett, and Hood, was initially delayed due to the absence of Pickett's division, which was still over 20 miles away. Despite Longstreet's request to wait for Pickett, Lee urged action but acquiesced to Longstreet's request to wait for one of the brigades from Hood's division before commencing the attack. It would be nearly One in the afternoon before Longstreet's march began. While Lee dealt with the logistics of implementing his plans, Meade had his own difficulties with Daniel Sickles, a New York politician-turned-general and Meade's Third Corps Commander. Meade had assigned defensive positions to all of his commands in what is now known as the Fish Hook line. The reason for Sickles' assigned position was either not made apparent to him or was certainly not to his liking. Throughout the morning, Sickles tried to get Meade's permission to redeploy his Corps to what he thought was a better position on higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road. Sickles believed that if the Confederates occupied that ground, they could use it as an artillery platform and make Sickles' position, and much of the rest of the Union line, vulnerable. Every time Sickles tried, Meade brushed him off until he eventually reiterated his original order. Still nervous, Sickles ordered a reconnaissance into a stand of woods just west of the Emmitsburg Road. The reconnaissance discovered Rebels extending the Confederate lines along Seminary Ridge. This information convinced Sickles to take his entire Corps and occupy the ground he desired. However, Sickles' decision to advance detached his Corps from the rest of the army, leaving his command exposed on neutral ground. This decision would prove to be a turning point, almost leading to the destruction of his Corps and having severe consequences for the Army of the Potomac. But it also had the effect of confounding Lee's plans that day. [Jim Hessler on Sickles' thinking] It was nearly one in the ...
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    1 h y 13 m
  • Battle of Gettysburg- July 1, 1863- 161st Anniversary
    Jul 1 2024
    INTRODUCTING! Our first coffee brand LITTLE GROUND TOP, expertly roasted by our friends at Bantam Roaster. Order your bags at https://www.addressinggettysburg.com/cafe THIS EPISODE was made possible by our generous Patrons. Become one today and get more than you bargain for! www.patreon.com/addressinggettysburg On the first day of July, they arrived shrouded in a foreboding misty rain. The Confederate infantry division of Major General Henry Heth from A.P. Hill's Third Corps advanced towards Gettysburg under a veil of uncertainty. While crossing a bridge over Marsh Creek, the head of Heth's column was halted by the familiar "pop" of enemy small arms some 700 yards away. It was a shot from the carbine of the 8th Illinois Cavalry's Lieutenant Marcellus Jones. The ball had begun; The Battle of Gettysburg was underway. The gray soldiers, anticipating a militia, were surprised by Union cavalry. This surprise, however, did not deter them. Instead, it spurred them into a cautious advance, moving from column into skirmish lines in the fields north and south of the Chambersburg Pike. John Buford, the Union Cavalry commander, was tactically maneuvering to buy time—time that the Union left-wing commander, John Reynolds, needed to rush his infantry up to Gettysburg. Buford had gathered intelligence that Confederate soldiers were to the north and west of Gettysburg. Armed with this crucial information, Buford strategically positioned his men to cover every major road coming in from the west, north, and east of Gettysburg. The shots fired indicated that the first Confederates were approaching from the west, a testament to Buford's strategic foresight. Upon being fired upon, the Confederates, seemingly undeterred by the presence of Union Cavalry, began a slow and methodical advance. Like a grey bank of storm clouds, they pushed back Buford's men from Knoxlyn Ridge to Herr's Ridge and, finally, to McPherson's Ridge, where Buford intended to hold until the infantry arrived. At Willoughby's Run, in the valley between Herr's and McPherson's Ridges, the veteran Confederate infantry briefly halted and organized themselves before pressing onward up the slope against Buford's brigades under Colonel Gamble and Devin. Just as the Confederates were gaining ground, the emergence of Union infantry, a complete shock to them, marked a significant turning point in the morning's battle. The unexpected arrival of the Union infantry changed the dynamics of the fight, and what started as a skirmish between cavalry and infantry was about to become a full-throated battle. Brigadier General Joseph Davis's Brigade of Mississippi and North Carolina men rapidly approached Cutler's right-two regiments, the 76th N.Y. and 56th P.A., from the west. The 56th Pennsylvania opened fire first with the command, 'Ready, right oblique! Aim! Fire!' The 2nd Mississippi and 55th North Carolina returned fire. Some of these shots raked the 76th New York as they got into position to the Pennsylvania men's right. At first, the 76th's commander didn't realize that these shots were from the enemy as he could not see any. He urged his men to hold their fire. Then a second volley came in, and still they held their fire. Finally, the 2nd Mississippi came into sight, and Major Grover, the 76th's commander, ordered his men to fire. After about a half-an-hour of fighting, three of Cutler's regiments, the 56th P.A. and the 76th and 147th N.Y., withdrew to Oak Ridge, having lost half of their men. Davis's men pursued Cutler's shattered regiments to Oak Ridge. Cutler had left two regiments on the south side of the Chambersburg Pike at the McPherson Farm. They had skirmished with Archer's brigade as it approached from the west. Cutler's sister brigade, the Iron Brigade under Solomon Meredith, had arrived on the field and was pushing into McPherson's Woods, thereby freeing up Cutler's remaining two regiments, the 84th and 95th N.Y., to turn and face the threat posed by Davis's men. Acting Corps commander Major General Abner Doubleday ordered the only reserve he had, the 6th Wisconsin, to leave its reserve position and "Go like Hell" toward Davis. Rufus Dawes, the 6th's commander, put his men in line to the right of the 95th N.Y. Aiming into Davis's flank, the New York and Wisconsin men opened fire, stopping Davis's pursuit. Then, suddenly, the Confederates appeared to vanish into the earth. They had taken refuge in an unfinished railroad cut that paralleled the Chambersburg Pike. What seemed a safe haven had proved to be a trap, and the Wisconsin and New York boys were ready to take advantage of it. Meanwhile, acting left-wing commander Major General John F. Reynolds was personally feeding units of the Iron Brigade into McPherson's Woods, something a man in his position should not do. While doing this, a Confederate bullet struck him in the head. Within 30 minutes of being on the field, the man who was leading the Union effort that morning ...
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    52 m
  • Stand To It and Give Them Hell- John Michael Priest
    Jun 24 2024

    “Stand to It and Give Them Hell” chronicles the Gettysburg fighting from Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top on July 2, 1863, through the letters, memoirs, diaries, and postwar recollections of the men from both armies who struggled to control that “hallowed ground.”

    John Michael Priest, dubbed the “Ernie Pyle” of the Civil War soldier, wrote this book to help readers understand and experience, as closely as possible through the written word, the stress and terror of that fateful day in Pennsylvania. Readers will gain a deeper appreciation of the personal sacrifice made that awful day by privates and generals alike. This invaluable method uses their own words to paint a rich tapestry of their personal courage and cowardice, and their failures and triumphs.

    Nearly 60 detailed maps, mostly on the regimental level, illustrate the tremendous troop congestion in the Wheatfield, the Peach Orchard, and Devil’s Den. They accurately establish, by regiment or by company, the extent of the Federal skirmish line from Ziegler’s Grove to the Slyder farm and portray the final Confederate push against the Codori farm and the center of Cemetery Ridge, which three Confederate divisions in what is popularly known as Pickett’s Charge would unsuccessfully attack on the final day of fighting.

    This is a book about combat as seen through the eyes of those who waged it. There is no glamour here, and no adventure. Nor are there accusations, confessions, or second-guessing from the comfort of an easy chair. Instead, “Stand to It and Give Them Hell” offers the brutal, heart-wrenching story of a slice of America’s greatest battle as described by those who marched, fought, bled, and died there. This is their story, and it is one you will long remember.

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    15 m
  • The Irish in the Civil War- CWI Summer Conference 2024
    Jun 19 2024

    Ryan Keating (California State University—San Bernardino) talks about the Irish in the Civil War

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    1 h y 3 m
  • Atrocity in the Civil War- Jaime Martinez, Cecily Zander, Ethan Rafuse, Angela Riotto- Moderated by Aaron Sheehan-Dean
    Jun 19 2024

    A panel from CWI's 2024 Summer Conference about atrocities in the Civil War. What defined an atrocity? What were the different types of atrocity? Historians Jaime Martinez, Cecily Zander, Ethan Rafuse, Angela Riotto and Aaron Sheehan-Dean explore this difficult topic.

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    1 h y 23 m
  • Did Civil War Soldiers Hide the Real War?- CWI Summer Conference 2024
    Jun 17 2024

    Sunday, June 9, 2024, 10:45 am. Frances Clarke (The University of Sydney), Rebecca Jo Plant (University of California, San Diego), Jim Broomall (Shepherd University). Moderator: Brian Luskey (West Virginia University) explore the question "Did Civil War Soldiers Hide the Real War?"

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    55 m
  • The 1913 Gettysburg Reunion- Thomas Flagel- CWI 2024 Summer Conference
    Jun 13 2024

    Thomas R. Flagel is associate professor of history at Columbia State Community College in Tennessee. The author of several books, Flagel has also worked with multiple historic preservation groups including the Civil War Trust and the National Park Service.

    Union and Confederate veterans meet at Gettysburg on the 50th anniversary of the battle

    This June 29-July 4 reunion drew over 55,000 official attendees plus thousands more who descended upon a town of 4,000 during the scorching summer of 1913, with the promise of little more than a cot and two blankets, military fare, and the presence of countless adversaries from a horrific war. Most were revisiting a time and place in their personal history that involved acute physical and emotional trauma.

    Contrary to popular belief, veterans were not motivated to attend by a desire for reconciliation, nor did the Great Reunion produce a general sense of a reunified country. The reconciliation premise, advanced by several major speeches at the anniversary, lived in rhetoric more than fact. Recent scholarship effectively dismantles this "Reconciliation of 1913" mythos, finding instead that sectionalism and lingering hostilities largely prevailed among veterans and civilians.

    Flagel examines how individual veterans viewed the reunion, what motivated them to attend, how they acted and reacted once they arrived, and whether these survivors found what they were personally seeking. While politicians and the press characterized the veterans as relics of a national crusade, Flagel focuses on four men who come to the reunion for different and very individual reasons.

    Flagel's book adds significantly to Gettysburg literature and to Civil War historiography.

    Source: Publisher
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    52 m