The linguistic principle of absoluteness leads to the absolutisation of a regulation in terms of the unrestricted scope of the applicability of its referent. Thus, the statement “respect the scholar” due to lack of qualifiers will yield the meaning of obligation as opposed to encouragement from the form of the imperative “respect” and this respect will be applicable to every type of scholar by virtue of the unqualified clause the “scholar”. The outcome is the obligation of respect to every scholar regardless of the scholar’s denomination, field of expertise and piety. The principle of absoluteness is utilised as a legal hermeneutical tool for the interpretation of evidences across the chapters of jurisprudence. A fundamental assumption in the principle of absoluteness is that the lawgiver is in a position to explicate his intention fully including all possible qualifications pertinent to the regulation and scope of its application in relation to the subject. Thus, by not restricting qualifiable terms the implication is that there are no qualifications to the regulation and to its scope of application. Having stated this the unqualified clause can be qualified at any point within the timeframe of the lawgiver which is a period of over two centuries. Thus, an absolutised verse of the Quran due to lack of qualifications within the Quran may be qualified and restricted by the statements of the Prophet or anyone of the subsequent twelve Imams. Analysing the phenomena of post-absolutised restrictions demonstrates rationally that the absolutised regulation was not absolute in essence from the outset but yet was treated as an absolute prior to its qualification since the qualifications can be delayed for up to a couple of centuries. This phenomenon reflects on the fallibilism of the absolutised regulations. Additionally, it shows that the issuance of unqualified regulations was resorted to at a pragmatic level and on utilitarian basis. The regulations are designed to secure their values in an overall manner and for the majority of individuals. Existentially it is difficult to conceive of absolute regulations; all regulations are bound by their existential contexts. In light of the above it is argued that: 1. existentially the lawgiver cannot be in a position to explicate all the qualifications beyond the lawgiver’s immediate context with a view to catering for the majority. 2. since the regulations are value-bearing the qualifications can be conceived through refined human learning and experience in every field of life. 3. existence being dynamic can effect change in relations of things to human beings. Such changes can qualify originally absolutised regulations and similarly restricted regulations may become absolutised by the same token.