We have Mark Dowd on, founder of Aziumuth Security and one of the authors of The Art of Software Security Assessment, to talk about the market for zero day vulnerabilities, and how mitigations affect monetizing offensive security work.

• https://www.azimuthsecurity.com/
• https://www.vigilantlabs.com/
• https://github.com/mdowd79/presentations/blob/main/bluehat2023-mdowd-final.pdf
• https://i.blackhat.com/USA21/Wednesday-Handouts/us-21-Hack-Different-Pwning-IOS-14-With-Generation-Z-Bug-wp.pdf
• https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Shwartz-Selling-0-Days-To-Governments-And-Offensive-Security-Companies.pdf

"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

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Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/05/25/ekr/

Links:
- https://hovav.net/ucsd/dist/draft-shacham-tls-fasttrack-00.txt
- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/fasttrack.pdf
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446
- SoK: SCT Auditing in Certificate Transparency: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.01661
- A hard look at Certificate Transparency, Part I: Transparency Systems: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/transparency-part-1/
- A hard look at Certificate Transparency: CT in Reality: https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/transparency-part-2/
- E2EE on the web: is the web really that bad? https://emilymstark.com/2024/02/09/e2ee-on-the-web-is-the-web-really-that-bad.html
- Launching Default End-to-End Encryption on Messenger: https://about.fb.com/news/2023/12/default-end-to-end-encryption-on-messenger/
- ekr's newsletter: https://educatedguesswork.org
- Over 25 years of ekr RFCs: https://www.rfc-editor.org/search/rfc_search_detail.php?sortkey=Date&sorting=DESC&page=All&author=rescorla&pubstatus[]=Any&pub_date_type=any

Subscribe to his newsletter at https://educatedguesswork.org/

"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)

Josh Brown and Paul Grubbs join us to describe how those damned spam calls work, and how STIR/SHAKEN is supposed to try to stop them, but have other privacy and security implications as well.

Transcript: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2024/04/30/stir-shaken/

Links:
- https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2024/rwc/rwc2024/98/slides.pdf
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3trxXF0-fRU
- Paul Grubbs: https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~paulgrub/

"Security Cryptography Whatever" is hosted by Deirdre Connolly (@durumcrustulum), Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf), and David Adrian (@davidcadrian)