Episodios

  • Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale

    Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale
    Sep 4 2024

    Burma's Quest for Drone Supremacy: A Cautionary Tale

    by Beau Chapman, Alexander Suster, and Steven Ahart from the University of Texas Austin's Global Disinformation Lab in collaboration with the Irregular Warfare Initiative's Project Air and Space Power.

    Burma's military junta, in its desperate bid to maintain power, has embarked on a complex and controversial journey into the world of drone warfare. From ambitious domestic production plans to covert international dealings, the regime's quest for aerial supremacy reveals a stark tale of grandiose dreams colliding with harsh realities. This deeply researched exposé traces the evolution of Burma's drone program, uncovering collaborations with China, Russia, and potentially Iran, while highlighting the junta's pivot to smaller, more practical drone solutions in the face of ongoing civil strife. As the military adapts its tactics, equipping commercial drones with locally manufactured bombs, the piece illuminates not only Burma's internal struggles but also the wider implications for regional stability and global efforts to control drone proliferation. Ultimately, this analysis offers critical insights into the challenges of regulating emerging military technologies and the potential for their misuse by authoritarian regimes.

    The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

    The link to the essay can be found here at the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.

    If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review.

    Until next time,

    Keep Warfare Irregular
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    18 m
  • Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning

    Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning
    Sep 2 2024
    Seize the Advantage: Three Models to Improve Security Cooperation Planning

    In this essay, James P. Micciche, a US Army Strategist, presents a comprehensive framework for improving security cooperation planning and execution in support of U.S. defense strategy. He proposes three interconnected models: one that emphasizes clearly defined objectives tied to policy goals, another that focuses on understanding the operating environment with particular attention to partner nations' capabilities and institutions, and a third that advocates for developing campaigns of integrated, coordinated, and sequenced efforts. Micciche argues that by implementing these models, the United States can better leverage its network of allies and partners as a strategic advantage, aligning with the goals of the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The essay underscores the importance of moving beyond discrete security cooperation activities to a more holistic, campaign-oriented approach that maximizes limited resources and accounts for wide-ranging effects in an era of strategic competition.

    The link to the essay can be found here at the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website.

    If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.
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    15 m
  • The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors

    The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors
    Aug 28 2024

    The Peril of Ignoring the Legitimacy of Violent Non-State Actors

    This episode explores the often-overlooked legitimacy of violent non-state actors and its implications for international security. We delve into how insurgent groups gain support from local populations and why current approaches to countering them often fall short. Our experts discuss case studies from ISIS to African separatist movements, offering insights on how democracies can more effectively address the root causes of insurgencies in an era of great power competition.

    About the Authors:

    Santiago Stocker is a Program Director at the International Republican Institute (IRI) and previously served as a Director in the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. The thoughts expressed in this piece are his own.

    Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham is Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and is a 2024 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a joint production of Princeton's Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point. The thoughts expressed in this piece are her own.

    The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

    If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.
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    19 m
  • The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces

    The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces
    Aug 27 2024

    By Antonio Salinas

    The Cacti and the Grass: The Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces

    Antonio Salinas offers a unique perspective on the collapse of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Through his "Cacti and Grass" analogy, Salinas illustrates how the U.S. attempted to cultivate a Western-style security force in an environment fundamentally unsuited for such structures. Drawing from his personal experiences and extensive research, Salinas examines the cultural mismatches, strategic oversights, and socio-political realities that contributed to the ANDSF's rapid disintegration. This insightful analysis not only sheds light on the complexities of the Afghanistan conflict but also offers valuable lessons for future foreign security assistance efforts.

    Antonio Salinas is an active duty Army lieutenant colonel and PhD student in the Department of History at Georgetown University, where he focuses on the history of climate and conflict. Following his coursework, he will teach at the National Intelligence University. Salinas has twenty-five years of military service in the Marine Corps and the United States Army, where he led soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the author of Siren’s Song: The Allure of War and Boot Camp: The Making of a United States Marine.

    The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

    If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.
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    17 m
  • Irregular Warfare at Sea: Using Privateers To Seize Chinese Commerce

    Irregular Warfare at Sea: Using Privateers To Seize Chinese Commerce
    Aug 20 2024

    by Christopher Booth

    Editor’s Note I: This article is part of IWI’s Project Maritime, a series exploring the intersection of irregular warfare and the modern maritime dimension. Focusing on current events and their underlying geographical and historical patterns, we aim to contextualize the drivers of conflict in the maritime domain and inspire dialogue on integrated statecraft approaches. We warmly invite your participation and engagement. Please send submissions to Submit An Article with the subject line “Project Maritime Submission.” Follow us @proj_maritime and check out our Project Maritime Look Book.

    Editor’s Note II: IWI is pleased to announce Christopher Booth and Walker Mills as the new directors of Project Maritime. Their extensive expertise in irregular warfare, national security, and the maritime domain will significantly enhance our ability to provide unique insights into contemporary maritime challenges. Both Chris and Walker have been non-resident fellows and have written extensively for IWI in the past. We're thrilled to have them join IWI and Project Maritime in leadership roles.

    In response to China's growing maritime power and America's naval vulnerabilities, Christoper Booth proposes a controversial solution: reviving privateering. He argues that employing private actors to raid Chinese commerce could provide an asymmetric advantage in a potential long-term conflict, addressing US shipbuilding deficiencies and exploiting China's reliance on maritime trade. Drawing parallels with historical precedents and recent irregular warfare tactics, the essay explores the legal and ethical considerations of privateering while challenging conventional thinking on naval strategy. This provocative proposal aims to spark discussion on innovative approaches to maritime warfare in the 21st century.

    About the Author: Christopher D. Booth is a non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative and co-director of Project Maritime. He has more than two decades of experience in national security and international relations, first serving on active duty as an Army armor and cavalry officer. He is a Distinguished Graduate of Command and Staff College–Marine Corps University and graduated from Vanderbilt University Law School and the College of William and Mary.

    The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
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    20 m
  • Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran

    Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran
    Aug 1 2024
    Eroding Global Stability: The Cybersecurity Strategies Of China, Russia, North Korea, And Iran In recent years, declarations like “no-limits partnership,” “comprehensive agreement,” and “security partnership” between the United States’ adversaries have become increasingly common. On May 16, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party Leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed their comprehensive partnership during their historic 43rd meeting. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian-Iranian collaboration has reached new levels, with Iranian drones becoming a familiar site over the battlefields. North Korea too, has upped its cooperation with Russia, working closely on schemes to avoid Western sanctions and even signing a mutual defense pact on June 19, 2024. The extent to which America’s adversaries cooperate on cybersecurity remains less understood but is a growing concern. However, as unified Western actions against rogue and adversarial states have increased (e.g., sanctions, public shaming, etc.) and hot wars roil Ukraine and Israel, the agreements and cooperation among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have similarly grown stronger and more unified. In this context, the cybersecurity strategies of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran have emerged as significant and irregular threats to global stability, threatening the contemporary geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, each nation has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities designed to asymmetrically attack the international security frameworks established by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Western powers. It is, therefore, important to assess how US adversaries collaborate in cyberspace and are using asymmetric and irregular tactics to undermine the liberal world order. Strategic Cybersecurity Alliances State-sponsored malicious cyber actors from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran increasingly dominate the cyber threat landscape and are driven by geopolitical, economic, and military objectives. Moreover, adversaries develop capabilities for strategic ends, blurring the line between irregular and conventional warfare in cyberspace. Importantly, their efforts are not strictly unilateral, as evidence increasingly points toward formal and informal collaboration among rogue states in cyberspace. For example, Chinese and Russian cyber actors have been known to share malware and exploit kits, enabling more sophisticated attacks. Additionally, joint operations, like coordinated disinformation campaigns, have been observed, highlighting our adversaries’ willingness to coordinate influence operations. Furthermore, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran also leverage emerging technologies, like artificial intelligence (AI) and generative AI, to enhance their cyber capabilities. Disruptive technologies can enhance already sophisticated cyber operations and allow for automated attacks, deep-fakes, and advanced social engineering tactics. AI in cyber operations poses new challenges for cybersecurity defenders as it increases the complexity, scale, and pace of potential attacks. How these nations use cyber capabilities, and leverage asymmetric advantages for strategic ends, underscores the need for greater international cooperation and more robust policy coordination to counter these irregular threats. People’s Republic of China China's journey toward becoming a cyber power began in the early 2000s. At the helm is the Central Commission for Cybersecurity and Informatization (CCCI), chaired by President Xi Jinping, as well as the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Cyberspace Administration of China. The “Great Firewall of China” exemplifies China’s commitment to information control, both domestically and internationally, and allows government control over the internet and information. By limiting domestic information access, the government controls the population’s understanding of other nations and restricts external access to Chinese-focused content, sites, etc. A key component of China's cyber strategy is the concept of military-civil fusion, which encourages collaboration between the private sector and military and integrates resources. The fusion is evident in the activities of major Chinese tech firms like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent, which play significant roles in advancing China's cyber ambitions and provide irregular approaches to securing technological control over an increasing percentage of the world’s telecommunications and digital infrastructure outside China. China's cyber strategy is also characterized by its use of state-sponsored hacking groups to conduct widespread and far-reaching cyber espionage and sabotage campaigns. The discovery of Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group, and its activities underscores China's focus on gaining asymmetric advantage over the US and its allies by gaining ...
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    18 m
  • Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific

    Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific
    Jul 25 2024
    Beijing's Long Game: Gray Zone Tactics in the Pacific Published July 25th, 2024 By Brandon Tran “During the progress of hostilities, guerillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army… There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.” -On Guerilla Warfare, by Mao Zedong The expulsion of former Chinese defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on June 27, 2024, is the latest development in a months-long series of personnel purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As President Xi Jinping continuously reforms the PLA to make it a “world-class military” capable of achieving the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) national security objectives, these purges illustrate an underlying tension that stems from competing priorities. Because the PLA is the armed wing of the CCP, Xi Jinping must make tradeoffs in balancing regime loyalty and military competence when selecting PLA officers for senior positions. As a result of this and similar compromises, the PLA remains unprepared for direct confrontation with near-peer adversaries. To address this gap, China will continue leveraging irregular warfare activities to incrementally accomplish its strategic objectives while buying time to achieve the level of conventional force development it desires. This article will evaluate how China’s use of irregular warfare sets the stage for its conventional force development, given the context of the competing requirements for senior PLA officer promotion, the PLA’s guiding principles, and the role of the new defense minister, Dong Jun. Loyalty and Experience within the CMC By necessity, Xi Jinping’s selection of senior officials balances political loyalty with operational and command experience. While he favors aggressive and competent commanders capable of realizing his ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, these leaders must remain politically loyal to Xi’s rule. His selections for the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2022 attest to this. In order of rank, they are Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu (who has since been removed), Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, and Zhang Shengmin. Xi’s appointment of senior leaders to the CMC indicates an attempt to balance loyalty and experience because many of his selections break precedent. Examples include Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, both promoted despite Zhang being past retirement age and Liu being the youngest in his rank group. These exceptions to policy were made because both Zhang and Liu have combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese border wars, a rare and valuable quality given that the PLA is largely untested and inexperienced in combat. In other unconventional moves, He Weidong was permitted to skip key career milestones before assuming his position on the CMC. At the same time, Miao Hua transitioned from a long Army career to become the Navy’s political commissar. Indeed, selection to senior leadership positions has also been based on personal connections and previous experience with Xi. He Weidong and Miao Hua worked with Xi back when he was a provincial official in Fujian, and both Zhangs hail from the same region as Xi, claiming membership in his infamous Shaanxi Gang. Chinese Strategic Concepts To put Xi’s priorities and the PLA’s irregular military operations into context, it is vital to understand the guiding principles that inform the PLA’s military philosophy. Since its founding, the PRC has adhered to a warfighting philosophy of Active Defense. Under this principle, conflict is believed to exist on a spectrum ranging from peace to kinetic war. As a result, the PLA assumes a proactive force posture, constantly assessing potential threats and carrying out activities below the threshold of kinetic war that could create a better geopolitical position for the PRC. Through Active Defense, the PLA would theoretically be able to accomplish its objectives while controlling escalation on the conflict continuum. In tandem with Active Defense is the concept of People’s War, incorporating lessons from the past century and a half and forming the backbone of the PLA’s tactics and strategies. From its inception by Mao during the Chinese Civil War to the present day, the idea of People’s War has gone through several revisions, but the crux remains the same. Warfighting proficiency must be pursued through all possible means at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The United States understands this in the modern context as being able to field a proficient joint force capable of combined arms and multi-domain operations. However, due to having to include party loyalty as a prerequisite for promotion, the PLA suffers from an acute “Big Army Mentality” that prevents the realization of an effective joint force. Consider the service component composition of the 2022 CMC. Four of these officials ...
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    14 m
  • Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy’s Global Playbook

    Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy’s Global Playbook
    Jul 18 2024
    Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century: Autocracy’s Global Playbook July 16, 2024 by Ania Zolyniak Anne Applebaum, Autocracy, Inc. The Dictators Who Want to Run the World, (Penguin Random House 2024) Irregular warfare (IW), often hailed as the oldest form of warfare, remains an enigma within the US defense apparatus and government at large. The Department of Defense (DoD) offers conflicting definitions, while Congress’s attempt at clarification in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024 only muddies the waters further. This definitional quagmire, as Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael Nagata astutely observed, has left the United States struggling in its efforts to become “the most effective practitioner [of IW] around the world.” While the United States grapples with semantics, its adversaries have wholeheartedly embraced IW as their preferred mode of confrontation. Autocratic forces, both in liberal and illiberal polities, are dismantling borders to establish a globalized support network that ensures their survival and enables their coordinated efforts to reshape the post-1989 world order. Enter Anne Applebaum’s latest work, Autocracy, Inc. Set for release on July 23rd, this book offers a compelling account of how autocrats are collectively fortifying their domestic and international power. Applebaum, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for The Atlantic, isn’t breaking new ground in exposing this cooperative network. Hal Brands, Samantha Power, and Maria Stephan have been writing about autocratic forces working in tandem to spread their influence and nourish their survival since about 2021. Rather, the value of Autocracy, Inc. lies in its detailed analysis of modern autocratic cooperation, its juxtaposition of current challenges with historical episodes of repression, and its guidance on how to fight back. In presenting her case, Applebaum paints an alarming picture of contemporary autocratic power and reach, while, perhaps unknowingly, revealing how the United States’ autocratic adversaries are coalescing around common IW advantages. Viewed through the lens of IW, Applebaum’s analysis makes clear that countering Autocracy, Inc.’s efforts requires both understanding their intricacies and investing in initiatives that undermine their efficacy while still embodying the very democratic values they are employed to dismantle. Misinformation/Disinformation Disinformation in warfare may be as old as war itself and is even permitted under international humanitarian law. However, Autocracy, Inc.’s tactics, depart from traditional disinformation campaigns in both kind and degree. Rejecting battlefield delimitations, autocrats pursue a “permanent and comprehensive struggle” against their opponents, exploiting globalized information and communication technologies. The Internet has become their potent IW tool, allowing autocratic forces to inject unrealities directly into foreign populations, bolstering their legitimacy while stoking political and social discord. Having honed their distortion skills by constricting and contorting the information funnel vis-à-vis their populations, autocratic leaders now exploit global information networks. They employ tactics such as “information laundromats”—sites mimicking legitimate news organizations to propagate foreign-produced fake news. Russia, China, and Iran make their falsehoods appear local and credible to foreign audiences. Today, Russia can not only convince its own citizens about American biolabs or that Ukraine was responsible for the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 but also convince citizens—and even some decision-makers—in democratic societies of the same. Americans witnessed this first-hand last year when Republican congress members stalled military aid to Ukraine while reiterating Kremlin-bred falsehoods. Applebaum also draws out the not-so-coincidental connections between seemingly isolated efforts of autocrats in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and elsewhere to use communication technologies to project their distortions around the world, poisoning the well of potential US partnerships with countries in Africa, Latin America, and beyond. She also warns that less malign forms of Beijing-controlled media are becoming increasingly available across the developing world, projecting softer, more favorable images of China in the hopes of accruing foreign support in a zero-sum game of global influence. Lawfare In terms of elusive American concepts, IW stands in good company with lawfare, recognized as first officially entering the American security lexicon in 2001—decades after China integrated it into its military doctrine in the 1960s. Today, the powers-that-be in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and the like have outgrown the limited categories of lawfare described in Orde Kittrie’s leading book on the subject. Autocratic forces are now working in harmony to rejigger the moral and legal underpinnings of the...
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    15 m