“I had a feeling of the essential rightness of all. He was dead and I was alive; it could so easily have been the other way round; and that would somehow have been right too.”

- Richard Hillary, Royal Air Force pilot, reflecting on the first German plane he shot down

In this episode we look at the controversial claim made by US Army General S.L.A. Marshall in 1947, when he asserted that less than 25% of US riflemen fired their weapons at the enemy in WWII. What is usually called the ratio-of-fire statistic, Marshall’s thesis almost immediately influenced the US Army did undergo training reforms to ensure more of its troops fire their weapons, which have succeeded such by the Vietnam War, over 90% of troops were firing at the enemy. The ratio-of-fire statistic had proven to be influential outside military circles, having inspired numerous social scientists to accept the notion that soldiers have an innate reluctance to kill, despite whatever training or propaganda they are exposed to. Here we dig deeper to investigate the evidence for Marshall’s claim and explore why it has proven to endure despite the controversy and criticism surrounding it.

"AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL."
– US Navy dispatch, December 7, 1941.

In this episode we look at one of the all-too frequent examples of a successful surprise attack in modern warfare. Most students of history are familiar with the basics: an (un)fortunate set of circumstances enabled Japanese carrier air forces to achieve complete surprise and inflict heavy damage to US military forces at the Hawaiian naval base. Here we dig a little deeper to investigate why the Japanese decided to go to war with the United States and ultimately why the attack failed to achieve the strategic goal set out by its planners. Seen mostly from the Japanese perspective, it is a tale of how pressures on policymakers and commanders often push them into making decisions against their better judgement and issuing vague military orders that result in sloppy execution.

"Moltke is not a general to copy but to study"
- J.F.C. Fuller

In this episode we look at Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder), the Prussian Chief of the Prussian General Staff most noted for the dramatic Prussian victories over Austria and France which led to the foundation of Germany in 1871. Most historians will casually acknowledge him as a brilliant military figure and attribute the dramatic rise of Prussia military prowess to his leadership. Not wrong, but not quite right. Moltke was not a battlefield commander and did not even issue direct orders at the battles the history books credit him for winning. So, we are talking about a system here, an operation which could win battles and change the course of military history without the need for or the personal intervention of a genius. Moltke was representative of a breakthrough in military thinking, organization, and efficiency carried out by what was an obscure group of professionals dedicated to such matters known as the Prussian General Staff. That every modern major military has a General Staff is a testament to Moltke’s historical importance.

“The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.”
– Henry Kissinger

In this episode we update a classic article written by Andrew Mack back in 1975. As I feel strongly enough that a 50-year-old article is worth re-investigating and much of this analysis is based on Mack’s original conclusions, I highly recommend you read the original which is easily available in digital format. Its full title is “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” and it appeared in the journal World Politics, Volume 27.

How do massively outnumbered, outgunned, out-trained, and out-supplied guerillas sustain themselves in the field indefinitely? What explains the paradox that even though the big nations win the key battles, such as the US with the Tet Offensive and the French in Algiers, they nevertheless find themselves in a weaker strategic position? Would the outcomes have been different if the civilian leaderships did not tie the hands of their militaries? These are rabbit holes that have some unsettling implications.

“There is a story, no doubt apocryphal, that gamers at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, have many times replayed the 1942 Battle of Midway - but have never been able to produce an American victory.”
– Taken from historian Robert Cowley’s book What If?

“Find better gamers.”
– My response.

In this episode, we look at the celebrated Battle of Midway, in which US naval forces decisively defeated the Imperial Japanese Navy. The prevailing narrative, as portrayed in two Hollywood films, was the plucky and outnumbered Americans were the beneficiaries of good fortune. A deeper analysis reveals that the two sides were almost dead equal in the most important weapons system, carrier aircraft, and the United States had numerous advantages stemming from its massive industrial base. Japan did not lose because it was unlucky or was the victim of an unfortunate confluence of events. The battle itself reveals many of the factors that the United States possessed over Japan in the capacity to wage total war.

This is the last of a three-part series on the Emperor of the French inspired by historian Andrew Robert’s biography, Napoleon: A Life. The book is quite good at revealing the human being behind the controversial historical figure. Focusing primarily on the military sphere, this episode examines the significance of military genius, that is, why is it that sometimes brilliance seems to have a decisive impact on history and why sometimes it is bounded by larger historical forces. Parts 1 and 2 saw how increasing responsibilities and difficulties hindered Napoleon’s ability to turn his military victories into lasting achievements. This episode picks up with his invasion of Russia and argues that with the handwriting already on the wall, genius could not overcome the various obstacles arrayed against him. It was quite an achievement to terrify a continent in 1815 with just 700 of his personal guard. But even if had had won at Waterloo, eventual defeat was unavoidable.

“Ukraine has achieved irreversible momentum.”
-- US General Ben Hodges, Retired, November 3, 2022

“From a military standpoint, I still maintain that for this year it would be very, very difficult to militarily eject the Russian forces from every inch of Russian-occupied Ukraine.”
-- US General Mark Milley, January 20, 2023

In the episode, we look at the nature of wartime reporting and investigate how the circumstances of the Russia-Ukraine in February 2023 have changed so much that previous assumptions in 2022 are likely no longer true. Russia seems to have succeeded in its mobilization efforts in the Fall and are currently applying pressure on the Ukrainian front. Ukraine is due to receive modern NATO battle tanks and field a more capable army than the one which defeated the Russians last year at Kharkiv and Kherson last Autumn. How are these changes going to affect the battlefield going forward? What does each side need to attain their objectives? This episode looks at historical parallels into the past to help understand the current strategic position and what to look forward in May and June when both sides will likely launch offensives.